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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant herewith submits to this Court the following issues for disposition upon this appeal:]
1).

Whether a Plaintiff, claiming negligence under the

theory of res ipsa loquitor, need only present evidence that the
defendant's negligence was the most likely cause of the injury
rather than to show such negligence is the only possible cause or
that no other explanations are available in order for the case to
go to the jury with an appropriate res ipsa loquitor instruct ion *
2).

Whether the District Court, by dismissing the Plaintiff !)3

res ipsa loquitor cause of action as a matter of law, by the grant
of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, has thereby improperly

invaded the province of the jury;
3).

Whether sufficient genuine issues of material fact were

remaining in the case to preclude the District Courtfs grant of the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law;
4).

Whether the dismissal of the Plaintifffs medical negli-

gence case pleaded under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor prior
to trial, by motion for summary judgment, was improper and procedurally immature;
5),

And, whether strong public policy considerations exist

requiring the application of the doctrine of res ipsa Loquitor
as an appropriate theory of negligence in medical negligence cases
involving the probable infection of the Plaintiff by a hypodermic
needle administered by a health care provider.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff instituted the instant action by filing her Complainft
with the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake Countyj,
on the 25th day of January 1983 to recover damages from the defendants for damages allegedly received when she developed acute septic shock following the administration of an intramuscular injectioln
by the defendant hospital's nurse employee, while a patient at said
hospital, stating a cause under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
(Record on Appeal at 2-6). Plaintiff had previously served upon
the defendant her ninety-day notice of intent to sue giving jurisdiction to the District Court (Record on Appeal at 3).
-2-

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake County>
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, granted defendants1 Motioh
for Summary Judgment dismissing, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's
res ipsa loquitor theory of negligence, and allowing Plaintiff
thirty (30) days to secure and identify for the record an expert
witness or face dismissal, following hearing before the Court on
May 22, 1984 and by minute entry of that same date.

Plaintiff

subsequently identified to the defendants an expert witness but
later withdrew that designation and entered into a Stipulation witfc
the defendants to make the previous Order final for purposes of
appeal of the dismissal of Plaintiff's res ipsa loquitor theory
of negligence, the same being reduced to Order of the Court on
August 27, 1984.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Order of the Third
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's res ipsa loquitor theory of
negligence reversed and to have the case remanded to the Court for
trial on the merits on that theory of negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 18, 1982, the Plaintiff, a 38-year-old
woman, was admitted to defendant Latter-Day Saints Hospital to
undergo a routine tonsillectomy due to a diagnosis by her family

-3-

physician, Elvon G. Jackson, M.D. , of recurrent tonsillitis
(Record on Appeal at 107; Record on Appeal hereinafter designated
as

ff

R. ,f ).
Dr. Jackson performed the tonsillectomy the following day,

March 19, 1982 (R. at 108). Previous to this time, the Plaintiff f|s
general health was considered good and unremarkable, all signs of
infection in the tonsils had subsided prior to the toasillectomy,
and the procedure was performed without incident and complication
and the post-operative course was unremarkable (R. at 108).
The Plaintiff was discharged by Dr. Jackson from the defendar}t
hospital on March 20, 1982 (R. at 108). Dr. Jackson ordered an
intra-muscular injection of a pain relieving drug, Demerol, which
was injected into the Plaintiff's hip area as she was leaving the
hospital on March 20, 1982 (R. at 108).
The Plaintiff was readmitted to the defendant hospital's
Emergency Room on March 21, 1982 at 1900 hours with severe pain
over the left hip/buttock area wherein the injection of the pain
relieving drug had been administered (R. at 108).
The Plaintiff was subsequently admitted to the 4-South
Intensive Care Unit due to the fact that she was

f?

acutely ill1'

due to acute septic shock (bacterial poisoning of the blood
stream) (R. at 108).
The Plaintiff was suffering from fever, rapid pulse, and
prostration (R. at 108). The internist on call, Harold S. Cole,
M.D., took charge of the case and consulted with Dr. Jackson
-4-

(R. at 108).
The events of paino.and other symptoms preceded the appearance)
of fever or signs of infection in any other place^and furthermore,
there were no other pains in other areas of the Plaintiff's body
(R. at 108).
The evening of Plaintiff's admission to defendant hospital's
Emergency Room on March 21, 1982, all of the consulting physicians),
consisted of Dr. Elvon G. Jackson, Dr. Harold S. Cole, Dr. John P.
Burke (defendant hospital's staff Infectious Diseases Consultant)
and a>Dr. Alhoy, were in agreement that the most likely event was
that the infection suffered by the Plaintiff was introduced by thel
needle employed in administration of the Demerol injection rather
than it came from any other source (R. at 109).
Despite the previous tonsillectomy procedure, the Plaintiff's!
throat did not show signs of infection, and in fact tested negative for the type of organism that was found to be present in her
hip abscess (R. at 109).
The area of Plaintiff's hip/buttocks was aspirated and tested
and shown to be infected with Beta Hemolytic Strep, Group "A"
(R. at 109). Again, her throat culture, relative to the tonsillectomy procedure, did not show the presence of that organism
(R. at 109).
Due to the severity of the infection at the hip/buttock
injection site, Plaintiff's physicians surgically removed, en bloc),
-5-

a portion of the gluteal muscle and tissue down through the fat
and subcutaneous tissue to the deep fascia and muscle, excising
the entire area in one elliptical piece (R. at 109)•
At that time, the Plaintiff suffered from a fever of 104
degrees Farenheit and required the drug Dopamine to sustain her
pulse and blood pressure (R. at 109).
Plaintiff remained in the defendant hospital for a continuous period of twenty-one days and incurred hospital costs alone
of $11,295.46.(R. at 110).
Plaintiff prepared and served her ninety-day notice of intent
to sue in accordance with the Utah Health Care Malprastice Act and,
being unable to reach a resolution with the defendants, filed her
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, In and For Salt
Lake County, on or about January 25, 1983 (R. at 2 ) .
Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and the parties
commenced extensive discovery on the issuesy Plaintiff did not
identify and expert witness to the record and proceeded on the
theory of res ipsa loquitor (See Record on Appeal generally).
There is no dispute evident on the record that the injection
in issue in the action was administered by an employee of the
defendant hospital and that the instrumentality employed to
administer the same was in the exclusive control of that employee
(R. at 101-102).
On or about March 20, 1984, Defendants filed their Motion
for Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits and memoranda
-6-

seeking primarily to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action based
upon the legal theory of res ipsa loquitor and compelling Plaintiff
to produce expert testimony to establish negligence and the
standard of care

(R. at 87-106).

Plaintiff filed responsive memoranda and the Motion was
noticed for hearing before the Court, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, for May 22, 1984 (R. at 154).
The Motion was argued before the Court on May 22, 1984 and
taken under advisement by the Court.

The decision was rendered

by Minute Entry of May 22, 1984, which ruledr in pertinent part,
as follows:
The Court feels that the infection could have
been caused other than by the negligence of
defendants. Res Ipsa Loquitor is not an
appropriate theory. Defendants1 Motion is
granted with to to plaintiff to provide an
expert and establish a standard of care and
theory of negligence within thirty (30) days.
(R. at 157).
The Plaintiff subsequently identified an

expert witness to

the Defendants but later withdrew that designation and entered in-<
to a Stipulation with the Defendants giving finality to the Courtis
May 22, 1984 Order to facilitate appeal on the issue of applicability of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine (R. at 164). That
Stipulation resulted in a final order of August 27, 1984 (R. at
166).
-7-

Plaintiff represents to this Court for explanatory purposes
that the expert witness designation was withdrawn as the expert
could not definitively testify on issues of negligence without
the instrumentality, i.e. the needle and syringe.

It was a fact

established on this record that the needle employed in the
injection in question was a pre-packaged, single lot injection
which is disposed of after use (see e.g., R. at 101-102).
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal with the Salt Lake
County Clerk on September 21, 1984 (R. at 167).
Many of the record references made above are to the factual
statement of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment; that Memorandum contains within it further
references to the depositions of the medical personnel designated
to this record as R. at 174, 175, 176, 177 and 178 respectively,
and being a part of this record.

Appellant urges a complete

review of these depositions by this Court for a complete understanding the the attenuating medical circumstances involved.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred by dismissing Plaintiff's cause of
action under the legal theory of res ipsa loquitor by summary
judgment for several reasons.

First, a Plaintiff need only present

evidence that the defendant's negligence was the most likely cause
of the Plaintiff's injury; it is not necessary that it is the only
possible cause or that no other explanations are available.
-8-

However, the District Court, by its decision of May 22, 1984,
rendered a finding that the Plaintiff must rule out all other
possible causes, without opportunity for a trial, in order to
proceed on the theory.
To grant such a Motion without trial improperly invades the
province of the jury as it is the duty^of the jury to consider
the defendant's negligence in a case under res ipsa loquitor;
once a Plaintiff has merely established the elements of the
theory, the Plaintiff is entitled to an instruction to the jury
on the theory.
Dismissal of a medical negligence case for failure to provide
expert testimony prior to trial is improper and premature in any
event as a Plaintiff has until the close of the case in chief to
present such testimony and it is unknown to the Court until that
time whether such testimony is forthcoming.

The District Court

in the instant case knew only that Plaintiff was proceeding
under res ipsa loquitor and improperly assumed the lack of expert
medical testimony.
Disposing of the instant case under its res ipsa loquitor
theory by summary judgment was in error as sufficient genuine
issues of material fact were present before the trial court to
preclude the grant of a Motion for summary judgment as a matter of
law.
-9-

Strong considerations of sound public policy exist to requirie
the application of res ipsa loquitor as an appropriate theory of
negligence in the instant case.

The instrumentality of damage,

the needle and syringe, are disposed of immediately after use
such that the same is not available to a plaintiff or a plaintiff|fs
expert and unfairly disables a Plaintiff's cause of action againslt
a health care provider for damages precipitated by & needle.
Without application of res ipsa loquitor as an appropriate theory
of negligence, a health care provider need only dispose of the
instrumentality in the normal course of operations to shield itself from any actual negligence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE THEORY OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR BY GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A.

A Plaintiff Need Only Present Evidence That
The Defendants1 Negligence Was The Most
Likely Cause of Plaintiff's Injury—Not That
It Is The Only Possible Cause Or That No Other
Explanations Are Available.

In order to submit a case to the jury on the theory of res
ipsa loquitor, a Plaintiff needs to meet the requisite elements
of the theory, specifically that 1 ) . the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened
-10-

if due care had been observed; 2 ) . that the Plaintiff's own use of)
the agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for
the injury; and 3). that the agency or instrumentality was under
the exclusive management and control of the defendant.

Kusy v.

K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P. 2d 1232, 1235(Utah 1984).
One of the purposes of the res ipsa instruction is to Mcast
the burden upon the person who controlled the agency or instrumentality causing the injury to make proof of what happened."

Id.,

Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the elementls,
he is entitled to a res ipsa instruction.

The trial court should

not weigh the conflicting evidence of the elements; this is the
jury's function.

Id*

In order to determine the appropriateness of a res ipsa
instruction, the court must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff.

Id.

Although the Plaintiff in the instant case was not even
granted the opportunity to present her evidence at trial under her:
res ipsa theory, the record as constituted at the time defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard contained sufficient proof
of the elements of res ipsa loquitor as stated in Kusy to require
submission of the case on the theory to a jury at trial, particulary if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff.
-11-

However, Judge Sawaya's decision on the Motion was clearly in
error as it required a much more stringent quality of evidence to
support the theory of res ipsa loquitor than the law of Utah
requires.

The minute entry of May 22, 1984 states that the reason

the Court ruled that res ipsa loquitor was not an appropriate
theory of negligence was because "...The Court feels that the
infection could have been caused other than by the negligence of
the defendants..."

(R. at 157; emphasis added).

The Restatement (Second), at comment (e), provides an excellent statement of the quality of evidence required:
The Plaintiff!s burden of proof (in a res
ipsa case) requires him to produce evidence
which will permit the conclusion that it is
more likely than not that his injuries were
caused by the defendant's negligence. . .
The Plaintiff need not, however, conclusively
exclude all other possible explanations, as so
prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. . .
It is enough that the facts proved reasonably
permit the conclusion that negligence is the
more probable explanation. 2 Restatement(Second)
of Torts, §328D, comment (e)(Emphasis added).
The District Court's decision, however, requires the Plaint if If
to exclude any an all other possible causes, and therefore imposes
upon her the obligation to prove her case beyond a reasonable doubjt ,
rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.

Further, what

becomes clear is the error made by the Court in ruling by summary
judgment; the Court heard noievidence—therefore, how is the Court
to conclude that there might have been another cause of injury?
-12-

The error in ruling on the issue by summary judgment will be
treated in more detail below at Point 1(B) and 1(D).
Even in bases wherein the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor is clearly appropriate, there are always other possible
causes of injury, no matter how remote, as there exist other possibilities in all human affairs.
The California Court of Appeals in Mittelman v. Seifert,
94 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Cal. App. 1971), recognized that after the
Plaintiff meets the conditions for applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor, a presumption of negligence arises which imposes
upon the defendant the obligation of rebutting the inference.

The

rebuttal, the court noted at page 674, must be by substantial
evidence and must offer a definite cause for the injury in which
the defendant's negligence does not inhere apart from mere
speculation or conjectural evidence.(Emphasis added).
Likewise, the California Supreme Court speaks in terms of
probability of cause in Newing v. Cheatham, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1975), when it describes the standard of evidence required of the
plaintiff in res ipsa loquitor cases:
. . .the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable where the accident is of such a nature
that it probably was the result of negligence by
someone and that the defendant is probably the
one responsible. . .It need not be concluded that
negligence is the only explanation of the accident, but merely the most probable one.
124 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99 (Emphasis added).
-13-

The defendant in Newing v. Cheatham advanced the identical
theory propounded by the Court in the instant case that "...the
crash could have resulted from causes other than the negligence of
the decedent."

(Emphasis in original).

The Court rejected this

defense as inadequate and held that "...Mere speculation of this
sort is insufficient to discharge defendants burden of explanation."

124 Cal. Rptr. at 203.

In Spidle v. Stewart, 402 N.E. 2d 216 (111. 1980), the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against her physician
alleging negligence in performing surgery based on the theory of
res ipsa loquitor.

The trial court refused to give a res ipsa

instruction to the jury.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed,

concluding that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, a jury could have determined that a foundation for
res ipsa loquitor had been made and that the defendant had been
negligent.

402 N.E. 2d at 221.

The Court held that the Plaintiff

had to prove that the result ordinarily had negligent antecedents
but did not have to prove that the result always had negligent
antecedents.

402 N.E. 2d at 219. (Emphasis added).

In Cummins v. City of West Linn, 536 P. 2d 455 (Or. 1975), thd
Plaintiff relied on the theory of res ipsa loquitor to establish
the defendant's negligence because the Plaintiff lacked any other
evidence.

The trial court entered an involuntary non-suit against

the Plaintiff and denied a motion for new trial.

The Oregon Sup-

reme Court reversed holding the the application of the doctrine wa$
-14-

proper:
The application of res ipsa loquitor is based
upon probabilities, i.e., if a probability of
a negligent cause of the accident exceeds the
probability of a non-negligent cause, then
this condition is met. . . It is a question of
probabilities, not certainties. It is also
unnecessary for the plaintiff to eliminate with
certainty all other possible causes or inferences. 536 P. 2d at 458-9.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to medical
negligence cases in Utah in certain circumstances; however, the
tenor of Judge Sawaya's ruling in the instant case would lead one
to believe that the doctrine has no application in the medical
negligence context*
Expert testimony is not necessary to establish the standard
of care in a medical negligence case and res ipsa may be applied
when the propriety of the treatment received is within the common
knowledge and experience of laymen.

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d

348 (Utah 1980); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (both
cases reversing the trial judge in the instant case, Judge James
S. Sawaya, on the application of the doctrine in medical negligence cases).

In Kim v. Anderson, this Court defined the applica-

tion of the doctrine as follows:
...when the impropriety of treatment complained
of is of such nature that lay persons could judge
from common knowledge and experience that such an
injury would not happen if there had been proper
skill and care, expert testimony is not necessary.
610 P. 2d at 1271.

-15-

Appellant contends that the fact that the same trial judge
who dismissed her res ipsa theory has been reversed at least twicei
before on the identical issue should immediately call into question the legal sufficiency of the order appealed from in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that in both K:,m v. Ander-

son and Nixdorf v. Hicken,

the Plaintiffs were at least afforded

the opportunity to present their evidence prior to having the
door slammed on their theory of negligence^ Plaintiff in the
instant case was not even afforded the opportunity to present her
evidence at trial.
In Wolfsmith v. Marsh5 337 P. 2d 70 (Calif. 1959), the Court
held that incidents of infection following a hypodermic needle
injection are the types of incidents within the common knowledge
of laymen as to whether they occur ordinarily in the absence of
negligence., The Plaintiff in that case received an anesthetic
injection into her knee.

Following the injection, she realized

severe pain in her leg and a small raised bubble at the injection
site and the tissue at the injection site was firmer than the
surrounding tissue.

Eventually the Plaintiff developed a slough

ulcer at the needle site which required muscle and tissue excision.

It was determined that the drug injected had not caused the

reaction and therefore the query was focused upon the injection
itself.

Plaintiff sued on a res ipsa loquitor theory and at trial

the Court directed a verdict against her, refusing to give a res
ipsa instruction.

The appellate Court reversed, and in employing
-16-

the identical requisite elements of the doctrine stated by this
Court in Kusy v. K-Mart, held as follows:
It is a matter of common knowledge among
laymen that injections into the arm, as well
as other portions of the body, do not ordinarily cause trouble unless unskillfully done
or there is^something wrong with the serum.
337 P. 2d at 72.
Therefore, the District Court erred, inter alia, by dismissing
Plaintiff's res ipsa theory on the basis that there "could be"
other causes of the injury; the District Court has clearly
imposed an excessive burden of proof upon the Plaintiff not
required under Utah law or other authorities interpreting the
doctrine, and did so without hearing any of the Plaintiff's
evidence.

The authorities hold that the doctrine is, in fact,

directly applicable to the facts of this case and has application
in this jurisdiction and others to medical negligence cases.

B.

By Dismissing Plaintiff's Res Ipsa
Loquitor Cause of Action As a Matter
Of Law, the District Court Has Improperly Invaded The Province Of the Jury.

By granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
District Court ruled that the theory of res ipsa loquitor was
inapplicable to the type of case before it without hearing any
evidence.

As the record indicates, the Motion was heard on the

Court's regular Law and Motion Calendar and was not heard in the
context of an evidentiary hearing or trial.

-17-

The application of th£

doctrine cannot be determined in this fashion or in the same mannen
that such legal issues as jurisdiction, constitutionality or other
such issues of law can be determined, simply by virtue of the nature
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
"Res ipsa loquitor is an evidentiary rule that permits an
inference of negligence on the part of a defendant under welldefined circumstances."

Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.,

supra, at 1235. (Emphasis added).
The applicability of the doctrine, and hence whet tier the
proponent is entitled to an instruction on the theory, depends
entirely upon the proponents evidence at the close of bis presentation thereof which is before the Court.

The application is not

a matter of law to the extent that an issue sukh as governmental
immunity is, but depends entirely upon a determination made after
the evidence is in.

To decide the applicability of the doctrine atj

a pre-trial stage is to ignore what the doctrine is—a rule of
evidence.
This Court made it clear that a decision on the applicability
of the doctrine by the trial court invades the province of the jury)
to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence:
The trial court should not weigh conflicting
evidence of the elements (of res ipsa)^ this
is the jury's function. Kusy v. K-Mart, supra
at 1235 (parenthetical comment added).
The Restatement(Second) provides as follows:
-18-

The conclusion (of defendants negligence in
a res ipsa case) is not for the Court to draw,
or to refuse to draw, in any case where either
conclusion is reasonable; and even though the
Court would not itself find negligence, it must
still leave the question to the jury if reasonable men might do so. 2 Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §328D, comment (e) (1965). (Parenthetical
comment added).
In Spindle v. Stewart, supra, a medical negligence case brought
under theory of res ipsa loquitor, the Court held:
Factual disputes presenting credibility questions
or requiring evidence to be weighed should not be
decided by the trial judge as a matter of law.
402 N.E. 2d at 220.
Stating the error quite simply, the District Court rendered a
decision on a rule of evidence without having heard any evidence.
The District Court has therefore rendered a decision without any
foundation in the record—virtually from "thin air"—stating sufficient grounds for reversal standing alone.

C.

Sufficient Genuine Issues of Material
Fact Were Present in This Action to
Preclude the Grant of Defendants1 Motion
For Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law.

It is essential to observe in this action that Plaintiff is
before this Court appealing the granting of a Motion for Summary
Judgment; a trial was not held nor evidence taken.

An analysis of

the grounds necessary to award a summary judgment of dismissal to
a moving defendant exposes yet another gross error committed by th^
District Court.
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A summary judgment motion must be supported by evidence,
admissions, and__inferences which, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the opposing party, establishes that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d

790 (Utah 1979).
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure, and for this
reason a plaintiff's contentions must be considered in a light most
to his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting himl
to go to trial; and only if when the whole matter is so viewed, he
could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should the
motion be granted.

Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413

P. 2d 807 (Utah 1966).
In negligence cases, summary judgment is appropriate only in
the most clear-cut cases.

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434

(Utah 1982).
Many issues of fact remained for resolution at the time of
hearing on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The instant

case, as is true with most medical negligence cases, contained
many factual issues.

These issues were plain on the record and

framed by the depositions of three (3) physicians, one nurse
practitioner, and the Plaintiff, and the affidavits filed in
support of the Motion.

As argued above, there was a substantial

factual issue as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
was approriate under the facts of this case.

Several other issues

remained, including, but certainly not limited to, the following:
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Source of the Infection; In support of its Motion, the defendants filed the Affidavit of John P. Burke, M.D., the defendant
hospital's Infectious Disease Consultant, who raised the issue of
whether the infection migrated to the injection site from the
Plaintifffs tonsil area incident to the previous tonsillectomy.
(R. at 97-100).

However, Plaintiff cited to the Court deposition

testimony taken from Dr. Elvon G. Jackson, the physician in charge
Df the tonsillectomy case and the shock case, in her Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment suggesting that this
nigration process did not occur, as follows:
Q: (By Mr. Shields): Dr. Jackson, concerning
the tonsillectomies, and,.particularly in Amy's
case, was there a clinically signficant risk that
this procedure (the T k A) would cause the bacteria
giving rise to the tonsillitis to be seeded into
her bloodstream?
A:

I—I don't believe so. (R. at 113; see also,
(R. at 174, page 26 (Jackson Deposition)).

Additional deposition testimony taken from the defendants'
Infection Control Practitioner, one Julie Jacobsen, was cited to
the Court in Plaintiff's opposing memorandum regarding the source
of the infection, as follows:
Q:

(By Mr. Shields): As I understand it, Mrs.
Robinson was diagnosed as having hospitalacquired beta strep, Lancefield Group "A"
on the hip injection site.

A:

That's correct.

Q-

Any question about that?

A:

None at all.
(continued following page)
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Q:

This occurred in her left buttock, where
that was injected?

A;

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q:

Is this type of infection what's called
"nosocomial?" Is that the name of it?

A:

Hospital-acquired, uh-huh (affirmative).
(R. at 115; see also R. at 176, page 20).

Testimony from the internist on call the evening of the seconld
admission, Dr. Harold S. Cole, cited to the Court in the opposing
memorandum raised additional issues of fact and credibility of
witnesses, as follows:
A: (By the Witness): Well, the evening of
admission, all of us were in agreement that
the most likely event was that the infection
was introduced with that needle rather than
it came from somewhere else. Now, I — and
I concurred in that opinion. We were sufficiently concerned about that that we sent her to
surgery to have the area removed, which we would
not have done had we felt an infection froa somewhere else had migrated there. (R. at 116j see
also R. at 178, page 14).
The citations to the record above, all of which were before
the District Court at the May 22, 1984 hearing, clearly show there
is an issue as to the exact source of the infection and/or whether
multiple sources existed, framed by evidently conflicting testimonjy
from the physicians involved in the treatment of the Plaintiff.
The defendants, in their

Reply Memorandum, raised an

explanation to the testimony of Julie Jacobsen, suggesting that
Plaintiff1s interpretation of the meaning of that testimony was
incorrect, raising a further issue of fact. (R. at 126).
-22-

Contribution by Plaintiff to Injury: Defendant raised the
issue in its Reply Memorandum that the infection could have been
precipitated, in whole or in part, by the conduct of the Plaintiff
and/or her husband touching the needle injection site by citing to
page 57 of the Plaintifffs deposition wherein she stated that at
one point prior to her discharge from the hospital her husband
climbed into bed with her and

TT

touched her all over.n

(R. at 124)*

Plaintiff contended and does now contend that the assertion of
contribution is without merit based on the testimony of the
treating physicians cited hereinabove and as cited to the District
Court; nonetheless, the same raises genuine issues of material
fact which impact on the third key element of the res ipsa
loquitor doctrine, and perhaps other aspects of the lawsuit.
The record in this action as a whole, and the citations
of factual matters contained hereinabove demonstrate clearly that
there were genuine issues of material fact remaining in the case
relative to the res ipsa loquitor issue and other material issues
precluding summary judgment as a matter of law under the standards
regarding such motions stated in Bihlmaier v. Carson, Controlled
Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, and Bowen v. Riverton City, all supra,
D. Dismissal of a Medical Negligence Case
Pleaded Under the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitor Prior to Trial is Improper and
Procedurally Premature.
In making its ruling as it did, the District Court flatly
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to the facts
-23-

of the instant case merely because it was a medical negligence easel
where the Plaintiff had not already produced an expert witness to
support a:theory of "straight" medical negligence.
However, to dismiss a medical negligence case pleaded under
res ipsa loquitor at any time prior to trial is improper and procedurally premature.

This is because a Plaintiff has until the close!

of his case-in-chief to attempt to make a case under res ipsa
loquitor and to produce expert testimony if he chooses to do so.
As argued under Point I, subpoint (B) above, res ipsa loquitor
is a doctrine of evidence and logically cannot be applied or refused until some evidence is heard; and in the instant case, the
Court took no evidence but ruled on the issue as a matter of law.
It is not a matter of law, but a matter of evidence.
Even in medical negligence cases, where expert testimony is
always an issue, the cases recently before this Court have not been;
ruled upon by the trial court until the Plaintiff's case-in-chief
was in.
supra.

See, e.g., Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, and Kim v. Anderson,
In fact, none of the cases cited above involving applica-

tion of the doctrine were resolved without trial.
Further, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an expert
does not have to be produced or made available until time of trial,
unless "exceptional circumstances" are demonstrated.
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).

Utah Rule of

In the instant case, the sum total of

discovery propounded by the defendants was the taking cf the
Plaintiff's deposition; never at any time was the identity of any
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expert retained by the Plaintiff sought by discovery nor was any
appropriate motion brought by the defendants.

Therefore, the

District Court concluded without any basis in fact whatsoever that
the Plaintiff either did not or could not obtain and present expert
testimony on the issue.
Further, by requiring the Plaintiff to present expert testimony
in some form within thirty (30) days of the granting of the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court far exceeded its
authority under Rule 26(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

District Court took upon itself the task of conducting discovery
Ithat the Defendants themselves could not conduct in such manner
gander Rule 26(b)(4).

As argued above, this Court has attempted

[repeatedly to inform this particular trial judge on the appopriate
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to medical negligence issues,, but evidently to no avail; this Court needs to again
Undertake that task by reversing the Order rendered by the District
Court in this case.

POINT II
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS EXIST REQUIRING
THE APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR AS AN APPR0Z
PRIATE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE IN NEEDLE INFECTION CASES.
As this Court stated in Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.,
^upra, the purpose of application of the doctrine of res ipsa
PLoquitor is to "...cast the burden upon the person who controlled
the agency or instrumentality causing the injury to make proof
-T25-

of what happened."

681 P. 2d at 1235.

Implicit in that definition of purpose of the doctrine is the
inherent conclusion that the person having control of the instrumentality of damage has a distinct and inequitable advantage over
the Plaintiff relative to the burden of proof, and therefore, such
person should then bear the burden of showing what really occurred<
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is founded upon sound
principals of public policy and justice.

Although a Plaintiff

generally does and should bear the burden of proof, the circumstan^ces of a case should not be allowed to make that burden an impossi^
bility; and when it is the defendant who has the exclusive control
of the instrumentality, which is always a critical item of evidence,
the Plaintiff's burden of proof does in fact become an impossibility unless someppresumption evens out the odds.
The sound principals of public policy and justice supporting
the doctrine have a very pronounced presence in the instant case.
As the deposition exerpts quoted above clearly state, the
physicians involved in the treatment of the Plaintiff felt that
the needle introduced this severe and debilitating infection into
her body rather than it came from somewhere else.

Whether or not

these physicians could reach a conclusion of negligence is not the
point; the point is that the needle was the most likely source of
the infection.
was the needle?

Thus, the question becomes, whose instrumentality
Who controlled it? And, finally, where is the

instrumentality now?

All of these questions are answered in the
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record and were not significant issues of fact in the case before
the District Court.

The needle belonged to the defendant hospitalf

was administered by its nurse and employee, Joyce Harbrecht, RN,
and was disposed of immediately after use as it is a single-dose
disposable needle.

Therefore, the instrumentality, a key piece of

evidence, is not and never was available to the Plaintiff or any
expert retained thereby for testing and other evidentiary purposes>
It is therefore the defendant hospital that had, at all times, the
custody and control of the instrumentality and could do with it as
it wished.

Is it not then appropriate to shift the burden to this

defendant to make proof as to what occurred?

Without this shift im

the burden of proof, all that a.defendant needs to do is to dispos<fe
of the instrumentality, whether by standard operating procedure or
deliberate concealment, to defeat a Plaintifffs cause of action.
In the instant case, the record indicates that disposal of the
needle is standard policy and consistent with the employment of
singe-dose injectables; however, the situation remains: the
instrumentality is no longer available as evidence.

Permitting th£

burden of proof to remain entirely on the Plaintiff in these circumstances is clearly inequitable and unjust and serves to defeat
any remedy and right which Plaintiff may have.
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in this
case would not unfairly burden the defendants1 defense; the
defendant hospital may still attempt to make proof that the infection migrated from some other situs, that the Plaintiff caused it
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or that she otherwise brought it with her, or that the infection
is unavoidable despite the best of sanity measures being taken.
However, it is they who controlled and disposed of this instrument
tality of damage and it is they who should bear the burden.
The unfairness of the burden imposed upon a Plaintiff to makei
proof without the presumptions of the doctrine being applied to
"even things upM is most distinct in the medical negligence
context.

The health care industry has protections against liti-

gation afforded to it not enjoyed by other groups of litigants;
the frequent requirement of expert testimony in view of the wellknown and well documented "conspiracy of silence;" the legislative
barriers imposed to discourage litigants (e.g., Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act); and the factual complexity inherent in such
cases.

This area of law is where the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-

tor should find its most widespread application.

There is no

logical reason, in law or in fact, why the Latter-Day Saints
Hospital in the instant case should be afforded any greater protection than the K-Mart Apparel Fashion store in Kusy v. K-Mart
Apparel Fashion Corp., supra.

What vaunted pedes/taX does the

health care industry occupy that would make it* more legally protectable than a K-Mart store?
The simple fact to be derived from the instant case is that a
severly injured Plaintiff has no access to

the apparent instru-

mentality of damage due to the exclusive control exercised over it
by the defendant and is thereby deprived of substantial rights and
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remedies for redress of her injuries unless able to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to shift the burden of proof to thesie
defendants.
Aside from the numerous errors committed by the District Courjt
in dismissing the caused plealded under the doctrine as argued abovfc,
the basic conclusion is that this is a case where the doctrine
is^appropriately applied and the case should go to a jury on the
doctrine for final disposition.

The Plaintiff demonstrated the

elements of res ipsa loquitor and the circumstances of this case
provide numerous policy reasons favoring the application of the
doctrine in this case.

CONCLUSION
The District Court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the
Plaintiff's causes of action pleaded under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor on the grounds, as stated in its Minute Entry, that
the injury ncould have'1 been caused by other factors.

The doctrin^

does not require the Plaintiff to rule out other causes with
certainty, but requires only that the negligence of the defendant
be the most likely cause of the injury.

Further, by dismissing th3

Plaintiff's res ipsa causes as a matter of law, the Court has
improperly invaded the province of the jury as the doctrine is a
rule of evidence and cannot be ruled upon as a matter of law; the
District Court took no evidence in respect to its ruling and had
no cognizable basis upon which to so rule.
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The issue was improperly decided by summary judgment as many
genuine issues of material fact were present in the record to preclude the granting of a motion for summary judgment.

The facts of

this case must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff on both the trial court and appellate court levels under the
law of Utah, and when so viewed, obvious genuine issues of material
fact remain.

Under Utah law, a summary judgment should be granted

only in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
The District Court further erred in ruling as it did on the
basis that the Plaintiff had not provided expert testimony and was
entirely premature in doing so.

A Plaintiff has until the close oi

his case in chief to so produce expert testimony, and by compelling)
the Plaintiff to locate an expert within thirty (30) days of the
date of ruling, the Court took it upon itself to conduct discovery
in advance of trial to an extent not permitted even to the parties
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
Sound considerations of public policy further exist requiring
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to the facts
of the instant case.

The doctrine is designed to shift the burden

to show what occurred to the party in control of the instrumentality of damage, and inherent in that definition is the fact that
the person having control of the instrumentality possesses an
unfair and inequitable advantage over a Plaintiff due to its abili-»
ty to make free disposition of the key item of evidence.

These

considerations are pronounced in the instant case as it is clear
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that the needle was the property of defendant and in the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injection was administered by the
defendants nurse and employee; thereafter, the same was disposed
of and not available to the Plaintiff as a necessary and key item j
of evidence.

The doctrine should have its most widespread use in

the medical negligence context due to the special privileges and
protections in litigation afforded to the health care industry not
afforded to other groups of litigants; special legislation, the
well-known and well documented Conspiracy of silence," and the
inherent factual complexity of the cases.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for an Order of this Court finding
that res ipsa loquitor is an appropriate theory of negligence in
this case, and reversing the Order of the District Court and
remanding this matter for trial by jury on the merits thereof.
DATED this 14th day of January, A.D. 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN
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ADDENDUM
M i n u t e E n t r y of
May 2 2 , 1984
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